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1. Introduction 
 
In these notes, I provide some general ideas on how to conceptualize poverty traps and 
speculate on their applicability to understanding Appalachian poverty.  My goal is to stimulate 
thinking on Appalachia that exploits contemporary perspectives in economics on the sources of 
persistent poverty and inequality.  To do this, I focus on both the theory of poverty traps as well as 
issues in the econometric assessment of their empirical salience.   
My discussion reflects the large body of modern literature on persistent poverty.  One 
aspect of this modern literature has focused on national economies, in order to understand 
continuing levels of deprivation in much of the world.  Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) is an 
extensive survey of poverty traps in development and aggregate economic growth.  A second aspect 
of the modern literature has focused on how poverty traps can emerge in overall affluent countries 
such as the United States.  This literature is quite diffuse; see Lang (2007) for a wide ranging survey 
of the poverty literature.  Durlauf (2004) provides a focused review of persistent poverty from the 
vantage point of neighborhood effects and their attendant effects on inequality2
I conjecture Appalachia may be an example of a poverty trap, although regions per se are 
not the usual scale at which poverty traps are studied in modern research, there are aspects of 
poverty traps for both aggregate economies and for local neighborhoods that provide insights into 
regions.  While I am not aware of any modern research in economics that explicitly studies 
Appalachia from the perspective of poverty traps, ideas closely related to poverty traps have long 
been associated with the region.  Over 30 years ago, Billings (1974)
; ghettos are often 
regarded as a canonical example of a neighborhood level-poverty trap.  Neighborhood-effects 
models, as we shall see, naturally lend themselves to thinking about regional poverty traps.  
3
 
 described standard thinking 
on Appalachia: 
The culture of poverty is the most common theory in the literature on poverty and 
Appalachia alike…Culture of poverty explanations, when applied to Appalachia, take 
several forms…Emphasis is on the debilitating effects of an atavistic, frontier culture and 
                                                          
2Jencks and Mayer (1990) is a survey of social science research that precedes the modern 
economics literature.  See also Manski (2000) and Durlauf and Ioannides (2009) for surveys of 
social interactions models, which focus on how groups affect individuals. 
3Billings argues cultural explanations are overstated, a position maintained in Billings and Blee 
(2000).   
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the socialization of its people into backwardness.  The subcultural claim is often 
buttressed by an assertion that, with the recent introduction of improved roads and mass 
media, Appalachia is experiencing its first contact with the outside.  (315-316) 
 
Eller (2008) further argues that culture of poverty arguments helped motivate war on poverty 
strategies for Appalachia.  One use of these notes, I hope, is to provide quantitative versions of 
culture of poverty arguments which will both clarify theoretical thinking as well as provide insights 
into how one can assess their empirical salience.  
One important feature of modern poverty theories, whether defined at the aggregate or 
local levels, is their emphasis on the interplay of a large range of causal factors in producing (or 
eliminating) a poverty trap.  This richness comes at a price as the empirical evidence for any 
particular factor is consequently difficult to assess. On the other hand, this richness is important in 
developing poverty trap perspectives that respect the heterogeneity of individual and subregional 
outcomes within Appalachia. 
Section 1 of these notes provides a description of ways to conceptualize poverty traps.  My 
goal here is to describe some probabilistic models of income dynamics which can generate 
persistent poverty as equilibrium outcomes.  Some of the mechanisms that give arise to this 
persistence are also discussed. Section 2 discusses identification issues that arise in statistical 
analyses of poverty traps.  Any claim that Appalachia is in fact a poverty trap will ultimately require 
grappling with identification; I argue that the problem is not insuperable.  Section 3 applies some 
of these ideas to Appalachia in what is admittedly a speculative fashion.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Income dynamics and poverty traps 
 
In this section, I outline some baseline models of income dynamics and assess their 
equilibrium properties from the vantage point of how one might conceptualize a poverty trap. The 
reason for proceeding this way is that there is no accepted formal definition of a poverty trap.  
Rather, the term encompasses, I believe, three logically distinct and mutually compatible 
qualitative claims about the nature of poverty: 
 
.i   poverty is highly persistent, 
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.i i  poverty is not “self-correcting” in the sense that some of the mechanisms that generate poverty 
are such that poverty can be perpetuated indefinitely,  
 
.i i i  poverty is perpetuated by certain aggregate or collective features of the socioeconomic 
environment in which individuals make decisions. 
 
The absence of either a formal or a scalar definition of a poverty trap does not, in my view, make 
the term unhelpful.4
i
   In contrast, in my view formal definitions of poverty traps are of interest to 
the extent they capture these qualitative claims.  One important distinction between poverty trap 
concepts  and i i  as opposed to i i i  is that first two concepts refer to properties of the income 
process whereas the third refers to the mechanisms underlying the income process.  What sorts of 
aggregate or collective mechanisms fall under i i i ?  One type may derive from the way agents 
interact via markets.  Another type may derive from direct interrelationships between agents. Here 
it is important to differentiate between individual interdependences that are adjudicated via the 
price system and those that are not.  The state of the coal industry affects poverty via the standard 
processes of equilibrium wage determination.  This contrasts with the idea that a given region is 
associated with social norms that reduce the value attached to education.  The latter types of 
influences are often known as social interactions or neighborhood effects; I use the term social 
interactions here.   
For expositional purposes, I focus on intergenerational income dynamics.  To do this, I 
consider a sequence of family dynasties i . Issues of intermarriage, fecundity, etc. are ignored so 
each generation of the family is a single individual who lives 2 periods. The pair of indices ,i t  
denotes a single adult, so person ,i t  was born at 1t − ; adding more elaborate lifetime structure 
does not matter qualitatively.  Adult income is denoted by ,i ty ; while income is not meant to 
summarize the individual’s socioeconomic status, it will be the basis of measuring whether or not 
the person is in poverty; for simplicity poverty is defined by an income less than or equal to POVy .  
                                                          
4For example, the lack of a precise single definition for poverty traps does not inhibit evaluating 
whether a given case is a poverty trap.  Following an example in Taylor (1998), the absence of a 
clear definition of money does not diminish the meaningfulness that a dollar bill is an example of 
money. 
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The mathematical structures I describe do not depend on the intergenerational context and may 
be applied to behavior within one lifetime.  On the other hand, it is only in a particular substantive 
context such as intergenerational mobility that one can discuss the mechanisms that may underlie 
the algebra. 
One view of intergenerational income dynamics is family-specific in that parental income 
determines offspring income.  The formal analysis of this type of model was pioneered by Becker 
and Tomes (1979) and Loury (1981); a deterministic version of this class of models produces the 
simple law of motion for family income 
  
 ( ), , 1i t i ty yϕ −= . (1) 
 
It is standard to assume that ( )ϕ ⋅  is nondecreasing in y .  As this model is assumed to apply to all 
members of the population, the equation is sufficient to describe the evolution of the complete 
cross-sectional distribution of income over time, and therefore allows one to characterize the 
poverty rate, measures  of inequality and other population-wide aggregates.  
From the vantage point of an individual family dynasty, an immediate implication of this 
structure is that for every initial condition ,0iy , income will either converge to a limiting value, i.e. 
steady state values of income y  such that ( )y yϕ= , or diverge to infinity.  Ignoring the latter 
possibility (which only adds technical complications at this point), the long run properties of the 
income dynamics process are fully summarized by the steady states of eq. (1).  
Multiple steady states allow one to provide one formalization of the concept of a poverty 
trap.  To do this, consider the properties of differences in income between two family dynasties i  
and j , i.e. , ,i t j ty y− .  If eq. (1) is associated with a unique steady state, then it is immediate that 
regardless of the value of the difference in incomes today, 
 
 , ,lim 0.T i t T j t Ty y→∞ + +− =  (2) 
 
In words, the uniqueness of a steady state implies that any contemporaneous inequality will 
disappear over time.  In contrast, suppose that there exist multiple steady states.  Further, assume 
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that these steady states are locally stable, which means that if a family starts sufficiently near either 
value, it will converge to that value.  Finally, designating one of these stable steady states as Ly  and 
another as Hy ,  suppose that relative to the poverty threshold POVy  
 
 L POV Hy y y< < . (3) 
  
In this case, there exist levels of poverty and nonpoverty that are fully self-perpetuating.  Eq. (3) 
thus constitutes one formalization of the idea of a poverty trap: moving from specific income 
values to ranges of incomes, families whose incomes lie in the vicinity of Ly  will remain poor 
forever while families whose incomes lie far enough away from  Ly  will not.   This captures the 
qualitative poverty trap ideas i  and .i i  
Under what conditions can (3) arise for dynamics (1)?  Algebraically, the existence of a 
poverty trap requires that there exist income levels 1y < 2y , such that ( ) ( )2 1y yϕ ϕ′ ′> .  If ( )ϕ ⋅  is 
everywhere differentiable this condition requires that ( ) 1ϕ′ ⋅ >  for some values of ,i ty ; it can also 
hold if there is jump discontinuity in ( )ϕ ⋅ .  Intuitively, in order for this form of a poverty trap to 
occur, it is necessary when one looks across families with higher incomes can experience more 
rapid income growth than families with lower incomes.  And what applies across families must also 
apply within families, i.e. it must be the case that for a given family, income growth is increasing 
with respect to initial income for some income levels.   Notice that there is no requirement that 
income growth is increasing in income at all income levels.  Hence, over a cross-section, one can 
observe an average tendency for income growth to be negatively correlated with initial incomes 
even though a poverty trap is present. 
Eq. (1) is a reduced form description of equilibrium behavior and so is a black box in the 
sense that it describes the equilibrium dynamics of income for a family but does not explicitly 
describe the mechanisms by which income of a parent affects an offspring.  In other words, the 
function ( )ϕ ⋅  is determined in equilibrium by the underlying decision problems of parents.  One 
mechanism that provides outcomes consistent with eq. (1) involves human capital formation and is 
the one studied by Becker and Tomes (1979) and Loury (1981).   The economic logic underlying 
in these models is straightforward: parents divide income between consumption and human capital 
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investment in children; these human capital investments, in turn determine income when children 
become adults5
While eq. (1) is consistent with the Becker and Tomes and Loury frameworks, poverty 
traps do not arise in either of their analyses.  The reason for this is that each placed assumptions 
on the production function mapping human capital to income that in essence, ensured that 
.  If the level of investment in children is a nondecreasing function of income and 
the marginal product of human capital is positive, family income will evolve according to eq. (1) 
with the sign restriction we have imposed.  Delineating this type of structure is important as it 
indicates that one must be careful in talking about causes of poverty traps.  As the human capital 
explanation shows, there is an interplay between the preferences of parents (which determines the 
relationship between income and human capital investment) and technology (which determines the 
transformation of human capital into income).  
( ) 1ϕ′ ⋅ <  everywhere.  Alternative specifications can produce different properties for ( )ϕ ⋅  and 
hence generate poverty traps while preserving the behavioral foundations of their models. One way 
a poverty trap can occur is if the production function exhibits a region of increasing returns to 
human capital formation.  A second way to produce a poverty trap in the family dynasty context is 
via lumpiness in human capital investment.  If transitions across human capital levels require fixed 
costs to be paid, then ( )ϕ ⋅  can exhibit a jump as the poor do not make these investments whereas 
the nonpoor do; Azariadis and Drazen (1990) is a classic example of a poverty trap driven by 
jumps.  It is important to be clear that this sort of explanation in no way “blames the poor.”  When 
preferences are homogeneous, the investment decisions of the poor are identical to those the more 
affluent would make in the same position.  
The example of fixed human capital investment costs raises an important issue in the 
economics of poverty traps, namely the question of whether they require some sort of market 
incompleteness to sustain them.  One reason concerns the ability of adults to borrow.  Depending 
on the returns to human capital investment, poor families might wish to borrow in order to invest 
in their children and break a poverty trap. One impediment to borrowing of this type was first 
recognized by Loury (1981): parents cannot borrow against the future earnings of their children.  
Other types of financial market imperfections have been studied, see for example Galor and Zeira 
                                                          
5This formulation is similar to economic growth models in which aggregate economies build up 
capital stock via savings and consumption decisions.   
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(1993).  This type of explanation implies that there can be efficient redistribution of educational 
resources in the sense that equalization leads to greater aggregate output.    
This first conceptualization of a poverty trap is fragile in an important sense.  Suppose that 
one allows for randomness in incomes via a variable ,i tε  which summarizes labor market luck, 
ability, etc., and modifies the income process from eq. (1) to 
 
 ( ), , 1 ,,i t i t i ty yϕ ε−= . (4) 
 
Questions about poverty dynamics, traps, etc. of course immediately become probabilistic in such 
a context.  For example, long run differences between families are more naturally described by 
calculations of objects such as the expected gap between two families in the future given the gap in 
their contemporary incomes, i.e. 
 
 ( ), , , ,limT i t T j t T i t j tE y y y y→∞ + +− − . (5) 
 
If this expected value is 0, one has a condition that is analogous to (2) above.  Similarly, one can 
calculate the probability that a poor family will stay poor for the arbitrarily distant future, i.e.  
 
 ( ), , 1 , 1 ,lim Pr , ,...,POV POV POV POVT i t T i t T i t i ty y y y y y y y→∞ + + − +< < < < . (6) 
 
If (6) equals 1, this is the equivalent of eq. (3) for a random environment.  On the other hand, it is 
possible for (6) to lie between 0 and 1, which provides a richer notion of a poverty trap, i.e. a 
situation where a family is in danger of being poor for the indefinite future. 
Income dynamics as generated by eq. (4) unsurprisingly exhibit very different properties 
from those implied by eq. (1).  More surprising, the introduction of even a small amount of 
randomness can affect the existence of a poverty trap, i.e. even if (3) holds for a world without 
randomness, (6) can equal 0.  The reason for this fragility is that the random term ,i tε  can act to 
overcome the effects of , 1i ty −  on a given individual.  Repeated draws of ,i tε  across time can, in 
turn, lead to realizations so that even, if a poverty trap exists without shocks, the realizations cause 
9 
 
a family to escape the trap.  A simple algebraic example can illustrate this. Suppose that income is 
either high or low, i.e. there are only two possible values Ly  and Hy  and that income dynamics 
obey the Markov chain 
 
 ( ) ( ), , 1 , , 1Pr Pr 1L L H Hi t i t i t i ty y y y y y y y− −= = = = = = . (7) 
 
Clearly this is an example of a poverty trap in the sense of (3).  On the other hand, suppose that 
income is stochastic and follows 
  
 ( ) ( ), , 1 , , 1Pr Pr 1L L H Hi t i t i t i ty y y y y y y y δ− −= = = = = = − . (8) 
 
No matter how small δ  is, one can show that each family dynasty will spend, on average, one half 
of the time in poverty; further, any rank order in incomes between dynasties at one point in time 
will reverse itself with probability 1.  Hence, no family is trapped in poverty and it is additionally 
guaranteed that any income differential between two families at one point in time will be reversed 
in the future.   
There is another perspective along which one can construct a sturdier definition of a 
poverty trap, namely the expected number of generations before a poor family transits out of 
poverty.  The expected number of generations before for this transition is 
1
δ
.  As δ  approaches 0, 
1
δ
 diverges to infinity so this statistic replicates the notion of permanent poverty when there is no 
stochastic element.  Expected passage times, in my view, are the more natural object of interest for 
empirical studies; put differently, a poverty trap as defined by (4) is a limiting and in certain ways 
idealized case of persistent poverty. In contrast, a poverty trap defined as a condition in which 
there exist long expected passage times out of poverty better respects heterogeneity in the effects of 
poverty on individuals as ,i tε  is nothing more than unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity.   
Therefore, letting ( ), ,P NP i tM y  denote the expected value of the first passage time out of poverty 
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for a family with initial conditions .
POV
i ty y< , then one can define families in a poverty trap as 
those for which  
 
 ( ), ,P NP i tM y K≥ . (9) 
 
The expected passage time before escaping poverty is, in my view, a natural statistic of interest if 
the objective of the analyst is to understand persistence, i.e. feature i  of poverty traps.  Of course, 
K  needs to be specified by the analyst, but that is not a defect of the measure since it is a 
judgment as to how much persistence should be designated a trap. ( ), ,P NP i tM y  itself, of course, 
does not require subjective judgment of this type.  It is worth noting that calculations of this type 
are relatively standard in mobility analyses which focus on Markov transition processes.  
Occupational mobility is a standard context.  
A third way to think about poverty traps, one that also permits a smooth transition between 
nonstochastic and stochastic environments, is to employ the structure of eq. (4) to uncover how 
initial conditions affect long run income levels.  Assuming that the shocks ,i tε  are uncorrelated 
across time (correlation in the shocks is trivial to handle as one simply works with the innovations 
in the moving average representation of ,i tε  instead of ,i tε  itself) one can construct a new time 
series 
 
 ( ), , 1 , ,,0  given i t T i t T i t i ty y y yϕ+ + −= =   . (10) 
 
The variable ,i t Ty +  represents the family income levels that would occur under the counterfactual 
that all shocks starting at time t  equal 0.  The properties of this time series reveal the extent to 
which current income inequality is or is not self-correcting as it studies income dynamics after 
unpredictable future events are purged; as before, this process will have a well defined limit 
 
 ( )lim , , , ,lim  given i i t T i t T i t i ty y y y y→∞ += =   . (11) 
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This limit is expressed as a function of income at time t ; it is possible that this limit is independent 
of its value.  Elsewhere I have argued that if the limit in eq. (11) does depends on ,i ty  so that long 
run behavior depends on initial conditions (in this case income), this property captures what 
economic historians have meant by path dependence.  With respect to poverty traps, one can 
modify (3) to define a poverty trap as the existence of income levels such that  
 
 ( ) ( )lim limL POV Hi iy y y y y< <  . (12) 
 
This concept corresponds to idea i i , that poverty traps involve the absence of self-correction 
mechanisms to overcome current poverty. 
 
ii. location-based models 
 
The family- or individual-specific perspective on income dynamics renders the location of 
the trap irrelevant.  In other words, there is nothing about the community or region which matters 
for the trap; if the members of the population were redistributed across different communities or 
regions, the prospects would be unaffected, assuming that eq. (1) is a complete description.   
 A second class of income dynamics, one in which location matters, may be trivially 
generated by including vectors of location-specific factors , 1l tc −  and ,l tc  in the income dynamics 
process 
 
 ( ), , 1 , 1 , ,, , ,i t i t l t l t i ty y c cϕ ε− −= . (13) 
 
The vectors , 1l tc −  and ,l tc  separately appear in order to capture location influences that occur 
during childhood versus adulthood. 
It is evident that the presence of these location effects can generate persistent poverty.  So long as 
there is sufficient heterogeneity in , 1l tc −  and ,l tc  and sufficient sensitivity of ϕ  to these vectors, then 
it is obvious families in different locations can exhibit differences in income over the long term in 
the sense of (5) and that a family can be stuck in poverty in the sense of (6).  In this respect, eq. 
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(13) is able to simultaneously capture poverty trap concepts i , i i and i i i .  Of course, since it is 
locational characteristics that allow a family in one region to become trapped in poverty while a 
family in another location is not, it is the case that location-specific subpopulations (including 
populations as a whole) can experience the same problem. 
Some elements of ,l tc  may be exogenous, canonical examples include geography and 
weather.  Other locational factors may not literally be exogenous, but may evolve sufficiently slowly 
so that they may be treated as exogenous over time horizons over which poverty dynamics are 
evaluated. Examples of this type include cultural norms or political institutions.  For purposes of 
analyzing income dynamics, the key feature of ,l tc  is that its behavior may be taken as given 
without rendering the analysis incomplete.  Manski (1993) refers to such factors as contextual 
effects, borrowing terminology from sociology. 
A different way to introduce locational effects involves introducing feedbacks from the 
behaviors of members of the location to the behaviors of each individual. These feedbacks can 
occur over time or occur contemporaneously. Focusing first on intertemporal feedbacks, let 
, , 1i l ty− −  denote the vector of income levels for families in location l other than i  at time 1t - ; 
introduction of this additional factor generalizes the income process to 
 
 ( ), , 1 , , 1 , 1 ,, , ,i t i t i l t l t i ty y y cϕ ε− − − −= . (14) 
 
It is common to assume that the average income of others , , 1i l ty− −  is a sufficient statistic, so that 
 
 ( ), , 1 , , 1 , 1 ,, , ,i t i t i l t l t i ty y y cϕ ε− − − −= . (15) 
 
Formulation (15) is the basis of an important class of formal models of poverty traps; Loury (1977) 
is a remarkable early version of this model.   In terms of underlying economics, this dependence 
can occur because of local finance of public schools; see Bénabou (1996a,b) and Durlauf (1996a) 
for examples of formal analyses of neighborhoods and the transmission of poverty.  A second  
source of the integernerational dependence in (15) may involve role model effects.  If adolescents 
make schooling choices such as effort on the basis of future economic benefits, the assessment of 
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these benefits may depend on the distributions of educational levels and incomes observed in a 
community.   Stratification of communities according to income will correspondingly mean that 
different locations produce different inferences about the value of education.  See Streufert (2000) 
for a complete analysis of this type of locational effect.  Recent research on the economics of 
identity (Akerlof and Kranton (2000,2002) provides a third explanation for (15).  Suppose that one 
effect of educational choices by an individual concerns how he relates his own identity to that of 
others in his community.  If the link between education and identity depends on the characteristics 
of parents, then it is possible that (15) is an approximation to the effects of identity on choice. To 
be concrete, in a community where few parents are well educated, high education can render an 
individual feeling alienated from those with whom he wants to share an identity.  This argument 
has been of long standing importance in understanding racial inequality as a number of authors 
have argued that black educational attainment is hampered by the perception that academic 
success is a form of “acting white” (Fryer and Torelli (2005), Ogbu (2003)).  Suggestive evidence 
also exists of low aspirations among Appalachian youth, e.g. Ali and Saunders (2008).  
A final modification of the income dynamics equation involves the introduction of 
contemporaneous locational influences, i.e. one allows for individual incomes to be affected by the 
current incomes of others as well as the current characteristics of a location so that 
 
 ( ), , 1 , , 1 , , , 1 , ,, , , , ,i t i t i l t i l t l t l t i ty y y y c cϕ ε− − − − −= . (16) 
 
When choices are discrete, this model thus corresponds to social interactions models of the type 
studied by Brock and Durlauf (2001a,2006,2007) and other authors; see Durlauf and Ioannides 
(2009) for a recent survey.  One source for contemporaneous income interdependences is 
informational: to the extent that labor market information flows across social networks, economic 
success by a member of one’s network can mean greater information.  Empirical evidence of this 
phenomenon is developed by Topa (2001) and Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008); the first paper also 
provides a formal theoretical model of information transmission.  
From a theoretical perspective, the introduction of , ,i l ty−  is especially interesting as its 
presence means that the model has the capacity to produce multiple equilibria in the density of 
incomes within a given location.  In terms of thinking about poverty traps this is of particular 
importance as it creates the possibility that two locations with identical distributions of individual 
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and locational characteristics can exhibit different levels of aggregate income.  How can this 
happen?  Suppose one considers work effort rather than income as the object of interest.  If the 
productivity of effort is complementary in the effort of others, i.e. the marginal product of 
increased effort by one worker is increasing in the effort levels of others, then the effort choices of 
each individual will be increasing in the effort levels of others6
 When can multiple equilibria occur? Brock and Durlauf (2001a,2006) show, for discrete 
choices, that the number of equilibria in a given economic context depends on the interplay of 
private and group characteristics with the strength of complementarities.  Intuitively, if private 
incentives polarize the population toward one type of behavior, then complementarities cannot 
create sufficient bunching so that the population on average tips to the other choice.  Further, if the 
distribution of individual-level unobservables generates large draws with sufficient frequency, then 
the percentage of the population left over to react to other factors will be insufficient to generate 
multiple distributions of self-consistent bunching.  This formalizes the idea that sufficient 
iconoclasts in a population can break socially-enforced conformity among others.  As was the case 
for the individualistic models of poverty traps, the robustness of a poverty trap for a social model 
of this type depends on the ways shocks impinge on individual decisions. Unlike the individualistic 
income dynamics model (1), however, what matters in the locational model is whether enough 
aggregate heterogeneity is induced to overcome the potential of strong conformity effects tipping 
the rest of the population. 
.  If this complementarity is strong 
enough, then there will exist multiple effort levels across a population; each of these distributions 
of effort levels is self-consistent in the sense that they represent Nash equilibria: no one has an 
incentive to change his effort level given the choices of others.   
 
iii. growth 
 
 The discussion up to this point has focused on environments in which incomes do not 
systematically grow.  The modern economic growth literature has focused on cases where 
                                                          
6 Formally, for a function ( ), ,...f r s , r  and s  are complementary if ( ), ,... 0f r s
r s
∂
>
∂ ∂
. In words, the 
marginal effect of increasing one variable is itself an increasing function of the level of the other.  
One can extend this definition to vectors and generalize to cases where functions are not twice-
differentiable.   
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interactions can lead to perpetual and endogenous growth.  The basic idea, initially proposed in 
seminal work by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986), is that the productivity of capital investments, 
whether human or physical, depends on the investments of others in the economy.  Applying these 
ideas to the Appalachian case, one would say that the effect of human capital on one worker’s 
productivity is increased by greater human capital on the part of others.  Lucas and Romer sought 
to explain long run divergence between developed and lesser developed economies and so focused 
on the case where these spillovers produced “social increasing returns to scale” which means that if 
the capital levels of others is fixed, a given individual faces a decreasing returns to scale mapping of 
capital into income, while aggregate economy exhibits increasing returns.  For our purposes, their 
model is a variant of (16) in which the individual income variables grow without bound. 
 In terms of the conceptions of poverty traps I have described, perpetual growth requires a 
modification of the various formalizations.  One possibility is to think of traps in terms of relative 
versus absolute deprivation.  This would involve considering the behavior of variables such as 
( ), ,log /i t j ty y ; the use of logs accounts for the idea that in growing economies, a fixed difference 
in income becomes a negligible fraction of the incomes.  A relative deprivation trap could then be 
conceptualized as one in which contemporaneous inequality can be permanent, with positive 
probability i.e. 
 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ,
lim
Pr log / , log / ,..., log / log / 0
T
i t T j t T i t T j t T i t j t i t j ty y K y y K y y K y y K
→∞
+ + + − + − + +≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ >
 (17) 
 
The threshold level K of course needs to be set just as the level  of absolute poverty had to be set 
in our earlier definitions of poverty traps in absence of growth.  
 One question is whether the sorts of generative mechanism that produce social increasing 
returns to scale in aggregate economies apply to regional economies.  Romer and Lucas put much 
emphasis on idea generation. Lucas (2009) argues 
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What is it about modern capitalist economies that allows them, in contrast to all earlier 
societies, to generate sustained growth in productivity and living standards?...What is 
central, I believe, is the fact that the industrial revolution involved the emergence (or 
rapid expansion) of a class of educated people, thousands, now many millions-of people 
who spend entire careers exchanging ideas, solving work-related problems, generating 
new knowledge. (p. 1) 
 
One can see analogies to regional development in this statement.  Bollinger, Ziliak, and Trotske 
(2009) find evidence that returns to education are lower in Appalachia than the rest of the United 
States, which is consistent with Romer-Lucas type spillovers, although this fact would arise 
wherever education levels of workers are complementary in production functions. 
 
iv. A summary statistical model 
   
In using any of these dynamic income models to assess data, it is evident that there are 
forms of heterogeneity that are missing.  One would expect that there exist a range of individual 
specific variables that affect outcomes, denote these as ,i tx ; as before one may choose to 
distinguish between influence in youth versus adulthood.  In empirical work, these represent 
individual-specific observables. Finally, it is necessary to allow for locational specific unobservables 
in both youth and adulthood. If we define the location specific unobservables as ,l tη , one has a 
general process for individual income of the form 
 
 ( ), , 1 , 1 , , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 ,, , , , , , , , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t l t l t i t l t l ty y x x y y c cϕ ε η η− − − − − − −= . (18) 
 
This general specification respects the distinctions between individual and locational influences, 
observable and unobservable heterogeneity, and contextual and endogenous factors.  As such, it 
naturally corresponds to the type of statistical model one would apply to individual income 
dynamics. 
Along some dimensions, this model is easily generalized. Eq (18) can immediately be 
extended to a vector of individual outcomes, so that the coevolution of other socioeconomic 
outcomes such as human capital can be studied in addition to income.  As the above discussion 
indicates, it is often the case that one thinks of various social interactions operating with respect to 
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outcomes other than income per se.  There is another dimension, however, with respect to which 
this formulation is incomplete: it says nothing about why individuals live in particular locations.  In 
the case of country-wide poverty traps, this is not an important lacuna given international 
immigration restrictions, but in the case of the United States, this needs to be considered.  In the 
poverty trap literature, the standard explanation as to why poorer families do not move to locations 
that will maximize human capital in their offspring is that housing prices and rents sustain 
substantial socioeconomic segregation.  When one considers racial inequality, discrimination may 
act as a separate barrier; see Yinger (1995) for evidence on housing discrimination and Heckman 
(1998) for a critique of this work.   
Before turning to econometric issues, it is worth observing that location-specific factors 
raise question of interventions to affect the allocation of individuals across localities.  In Durlauf 
(1996b) I have termed this associational redistribution.  Many locational factors act as externalities 
in the sense that they are not directly adjudicated by markets; peer group effects are a standard 
example.  This is so even if prices (i.e. house prices or rents) for locations support the allocation of 
agents; see Becker and Murphy (2000) for a very clear treatment and Bénabou (1996a) for detailed 
analysis.  Hence, it would seem that there can be efficient interventions in market allocations of 
individuals across locations. On the other hand, the presence of complementarities between 
characteristics of agents can render stratification by these characteristics efficient; this is Becker’s 
classic (1973) result on the efficiency of assortative matching, i.e. stratification of groupings.  One 
can identify cases where complementarity does not render assortative matching efficient (Prat 
(2002), Durlauf and Seshadri (2003)); Bénabou (1996b) is a standard reference for studying the 
efficiency of stratification in the context of school districts when complementarities occur at both 
local and aggregate levels.  Nevertheless, Becker’s basic message delimits the probable efficiency 
gains from government interventions in group formation that are designed to equalize agent 
characteristics across groups.  Location-driven poverty traps may therefore represent an example in 
which one may have to trade off equality against efficiency. 
  
 
3. Identification 
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 In this section, I discuss the question of identifying poverty traps.  The objective of the 
discussion is to both illustrate the identification problems that arise in producing elements of 
poverty traps as well as to describe strategies for overcoming these problems.  To make the general 
econometric issues concrete, I consider a specific empirical proposition and its interpretation.  
Suppose one argues that Appalachia’s historically high poverty rates as compared to the rest of the 
country represent prima facie evidence of a poverty trap. I would argue that the empirical 
regularity, i.e. the fact of historically high poverty rates, does not necessarily constitute evidence of 
a poverty trap with respect to any of the ideas underlying the poverty trap notion.  Idea ,i  
persistence in individual level poverty is not demonstrated by the empirical regularity for an 
obvious reason: persistence in individual poverty does not logically restrict aggregate poverty levels 
in a location.   This follows immediately from the fact that the percentage of a population in 
poverty does not identify anything about the dynamics of individual poverty processes7
i i
.  Further, 
one can think of a plethora of reasons why high aggregate poverty rates in a region would be 
uninteresting from a policy perspective.  One reason is migration; persistent poverty in a location 
can reflect location decisions of agents who would be poor regardless of location; by analogy, the 
concentration of poor in low quality housing does not imply that low quality housing is a poverty 
trap.  Idea , absence of self-correction of poverty cannot be deduced from high aggregate poverty 
for exactly the same reasons.  Idea i i i , the presence of aggregate reasons for individual poverty, 
does not follow from persistent poverty either. Here the reason is simple: nothing in the aggregate 
poverty fact speaks to its causes.  One cannot tell from high aggregate poverty whether it is due to 
low family specific investments in human capital because of individual family poverty, a weak tax 
base for public education, absence of incentives to invest due to the state of the coal industry, 
particular social norms about education or other factors.  Taking poverty trap ideas seriously 
requires much more detailed knowledge about individual income dynamics. 
 
i. evaluating poverty traps via time series properties 
 
 One strategy for generating evidence of poverty traps may be derived from explicit 
consideration of the time series properties of individual income dynamics.  Calculations of this 
                                                          
7The mathematical point is that poverty in a region is a description of the cross-section density of 
incomes at a point in time, which does not map one for one back to a particular dynamic process 
for the incomes.  
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type directly address the phenomena of persistence and absence of self-correction in poverty.  As 
suggested above, it is important to allow for nonlinearities in the transition function. Despite their 
commonality in theoretical work there has been relatively little empirical work on the question of 
nonlinearities in the intergenerational transmission mechanism.  For the United States, exceptions 
include Cooper, Durlauf and Johnson (1994), who find little correlation between parental and 
offspring income outside the tails of the income distribution. A particularly careful analysis for 
non-US data is Antman and McKenzie (2007) which estimates nonlinear intergenerational models 
for 15 years of individual data on urban Mexican workers and finds little evidence of nonlinearity.   
 In translating the statistical notions of poverty traps into econometric analysis, it is 
important to recognize an important limitation: namely, while poverty traps require the possibility 
that the rich grow faster than the poor, the observation that the poor in fact grow faster than the 
rich does not imply the absence of a poverty trap.  The reason can be seen in the nonstochastic 
version of the individual-based poverty trap model described by eqs. (1) and (3): in the vicinity of 
each of the steady states described in eq. (3), one has the property of local convergence, i.e. those 
below the steady state grow towards it while those above it shrink.  Bernard and Durlauf (1996) 
discuss this problem.  One implication of their analysis is that linear models of income dynamics 
cannot be used to assess poverty persistence; specifically it is possible to find a cross-sectional 
correlation between initial income and income growth in an environment with poverty traps 
because this correlation does not account for any nonlinearities associated with the poverty trap.  
 A second identification problem concerns nonlinearity versus poverty traps.  Following 
Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005), the difficulty arises in the relationship between clustering of 
behaviors around a discrete number of values and the presence or absence of multiple steady 
states.  Clustering implies that there are few observations that are not associated with the clusters 
and hence uncovering transition dynamics towards clusters is difficult.  In the context of our 
model, the problem can occur because of a lack of information about behaviors around the 
discontinuities in (1); for the continuous case the problem would arise if the set of income over 
which ( ) 1ϕ′ ⋅ >  is small.  This reinforces the importance, in my view, of focusing on transition 
times out of poverty; shorter transition times are presumably reasonably easy to estimate. 
 A distinct problem arises with respect to the accuracy of estimates if one treats the 
definition of a poverty trap as requiring permanent poverty.  Such a stark requirement is difficult to 
assess from data which are observable over a relatively small epoch, say 50 years.  In the time 
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series literature, this problem has arisen in the context of the study of unit roots in macroeconomic 
data.  A unit root in a time series requires that some part of the contemporary change in a time 
series permanently affects the level of a time series, so there is a close relationship to the poverty 
trap claim that a change can leave someone in or out of a trap. For income ty , the expected long 
run implication of a contemporaneous change in income may be calculated via 
 
 ( ) ( )lim cov ,T t T t t t j
j
E y y y y
∞
→∞ + −
=−∞
∆ = ∆ ∆∑  (19) 
 
Hence calculating permanent effects involves high order covariances, which are extremely difficult 
to estimate accurately without extremely long samples, an issue first assessed in Cochrane (1988).  
Thus, if one formalized the notion of a poverty trap as requiring that some transformation of 
aggregate poverty rates exhibits a unit root, evidentiary support will be problematic.  The same 
holds for other conceptions of poverty traps; the semiparametric analyses such as Cooper, 
Johnson, and Durlauf and Antman and McKenzie avoid this problem by focusing on transitions 
across a single generation which rules out any higher order temporal dynamics.   In my view, this 
problem reinforces the importance of focusing on probabilities of passage out of poverty for 
different time horizons.  
 
ii. locational mechanisms 
 
 A different strategy for uncovering poverty traps is to focus not on time series regularities, 
but on the identification of feedbacks from various locational characteristics that correspond to 
contextual and endogenous social interaction influences on individual outcomes.  From this 
viewpoint, the objects of interest are the derivatives of eq. (18) with respect to the social 
interactions variables.  If one can uncover these derivatives, one can infer poverty trap outcomes in 
the sense of i i i .  This is the strategy that is employed in the social interactions literature.  The 
most common social interactions models are linear regression variants of (18); if one were to map 
(18) into a linear regression it would take the form 
 
 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 , , 1 2 , , , 1 , ,i t i t i t l t l t i l t i l t l t l t i ty x x c c y yκ α α β β γ γ η η ε− − − − − −= + + + + + + + + + . (20) 
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The most important variant of this model is one in which choices are discrete variables. For 
simplicity, I focus on the binary choice case; denote these outcomes , {0,1}i ty ∈ .  In this approach, 
the net utility to choice 1 by agent i  at t , ,i tu , obeys an analog to (20)  
 
 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 , , 1 2 , , , 1 , ,i t i t i t l t l t i l t i l t l t l t i tu x x c c y yκ α α β β γ γ η η ε− − − − − −= + + + + + + + + +  (21) 
 
so that the observed behavior follows 
 
 , , ,1 if 0;  0 otherwisei t i t i ty u y= > = . (22) 
 
My specifications of both the linear regression and binary choice models are more complicated 
than the statistical models that have usually been employed to study social interactions.   Note that 
the specifications assume that the elements of x  and c  are known.  This can be problematic since 
theoretical models of individual and location determinants typically fail to specify how 
determinants should be measured.  For role models, is the correct variable the percentage of white 
collar jobs among adults or the percentage of college graduates among adults?  This sort of 
question can be repeatedly asked.  Further, the specifications follow the literature in taking 
locations that define social interactions as known. As argued in Akerlof (1997), it is natural to think 
about agents arrayed in a possibly high dimensional social space; this may or may not correspond 
well to counties and neighborhoods, which define the locations over which measurement is 
conventionally done.   
The econometrics literature has shown that three distinct identification problems when 
attempting to uncover locational influences when using statistical models of the type I have 
described.  Durlauf and Ioannides (2009) provide formalizations of the problems as well as an 
exhaustive description of the literature.  Here, I simply wish to describe the problems a researcher 
faces.  
 The first identification problem facing studies of social influences was initially t studied in 
Manski (1993) and is known as the reflection problem.  The reflection problem refers to 
difficulties in disentangling the role of contextual effects , 1l tc −  and ,l tc  from the endogenous effects 
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, , 1i l ty− −  and , ,i l ty− . This difficulty arises because the contextual effects help to determine 
equilibrium values of the endogenous effects.  Manski provides a demonstration that for cross-
section linear models, the reflection problem may render it impossible to identify different 
locational effect parameters.  Brock and Durlauf (2001a) show that the reflection problem does 
not arise in discrete choice models in the sense that because these models are nonlinear, 
collinearity between contextual and endogenous effects may be ruled out, so long as there is 
sufficient variability in the contextual effects across locations.  Brock and Durlauf (2001b) shows 
that the reflection problem can also be overcome in dynamic contexts because dynamics can affect 
the degree of linear dependence between the contextual and endogenous effects.  Nevertheless, 
even if identification does not fail per se, the reflection problem indicates that parameter estimates 
may be highly imprecise.  
A second econometric problem derives from self-selection into locations.  In terms of the 
underlying econometrics, self-selection means that 
 
 ( ), , 1 , , 1 , , , 1 , , , 1 ,, , , , , , 0i t i t i t l t l t i l t i l t l t l tE x x c c y yε η η− − − − − − ≠ . (23) 
 
The economic reasoning underlying these conditional expectations has been standard since 
Heckman’s (1979) pioneering work: if agents choose locations, then knowledge of the chosen 
location will provide information about an individual’s unobserved heterogeneity, since that 
heterogeneity will interact with other factors producing the choice. 
 Following the broader microeconometrics literature, self-selection in locations is typically 
addressed in two ways.  First, instrumental variables may be employed.  An early and well known 
application of this strategy is Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992) who studied social interactions in 
schools.  In order to address self-selection in schools, Evans Oates and Schwab used school district 
level instruments, arguing that self-selection is limited to schools within districts, and not the 
districts per se.  This example reveals some of the difficulties in using instrumental variables.  Even 
if the Evans, Oates and Schwab argument on self-selection is correct, this is not sufficient to ensure 
instrument validity.  The problem is that ,i tε  contains all factors that are not accounted for by the 
locational and individual-specific controls.  In order for a district-level instrument to be valid, one 
must be able to argue that it is not correlated with any of these factors.  As a mathematical 
23 
 
statement, the presence of ,l tη  is sufficient to make this impossible, except for nongeneric cases.  
Substantively, the problem is what Brock and Durlauf (2001c) have called theory-opendendness:  
models such as eqs. (20) and (21) are not derived from full specifications of individual decision 
problems and therefore do not rule out determinants outside of those that are included.   For the 
Evans, Oates and Schwab context, it is not unreasonable to conjecture that an instrument such as 
district level dropout rates is correlated with per pupil expenditure or broader social norms that 
affect decisions.    
 A second strategy is to explicitly model the self-selection process.  In turn, there are two 
ways to proceed. One approach involves coupling the outcome equations (20) and (22) with 
models of the locational selection process; Epple and Sieg (1999) is a nice example.  The other 
approach, one which requires less a priori information on the location choice process, is due to 
Heckman (1979) and involves introducing regressors, which are estimates of the conditional 
expectation in (23) modulo a constant of proportionality.  These regressors control for (23) and 
this is in fact known as the control function approach.  While implementation of the control 
function approach is most often done using parametric assumptions on the probability density of 
unobserved heterogeneity, there are semiparametric ways to construct selection corrections.   
Either variant of this second strategy is, in my view, preferable to the use of instrumental 
variables.  In particular, explicit analysis of self-selection can assist in the identification of social 
interactions.  Brock and Durlauf (2001b) first demonstrated that it was possible for the reflection 
problem to preclude identification when individuals are randomly assigned to locations while if 
locations were chosen, identification was possible; Brock and Durlauf (2006) and Ioannides and 
Zabel (2008) extend this approach theoretically with Iaonnides and Zabel applying it successfully to 
demonstrate the presence of social interactions in housing valuation. Why would self-selection 
facilitate identification?  Selection of locations constitutes an additional choice on the part of 
individuals, and so contains information on the determinants of these choices, determinants that 
presumably include the social interactions that will be experienced conditional on residing in the 
location.  This information can help to triangulate the presence of social interactions to the extent 
that the interactions influence his locational choices. 
 A third identification problem derives from the presence of unobserved location-level 
heterogeneity, i.e. the presence of , 1l tη −  and ,l tη  in (20) and (21). In my judgment, the 
identification of social interactions effects in the presence of unobserved group effects represents 
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the major existing impediment to developing evidence of the role of social influences.  First, it is 
generally the case that for those contexts in which social interactions are usually studied, there are 
many unobserved group characteristics that can be plausibly argued to affect individual outcomes. 
For Appalachia, factors ranging from the quality of legal and political institutions to geography 
plausibly matter in explaining poverty, but are difficult to measure.  Second, unlike the case of self-
selection, unobserved group factors do not themselves typically derive from a behavioral model the 
way that location selection does. Hence, there is nothing analogous to the control function 
approach that may be employed to address their presence. Most efforts to address unobserved 
group effects have therefore involved instrumental variables methods or, when the effects are time 
invariant, differencing of data to exploit temporal variation.   
For the reasons I have outlined, there continues to be considerable disagreement about the 
empirical importance of social interactions. Recent econometric work has focused on uncovering 
robust evidence.  By robust evidence, I mean evidence of social interactions that explicitly accounts 
for the presence of various types of unobserved individual and locational heterogeneity.  
One approach to developing robust evidence is due to Brock and Durlauf (2007) for 
binary outcomes and in essence does the following.  Suppose that one observes that there exist two 
locations, l  and l′  and a vector z  which is a sufficient statistic for the effects of individual and 
contextual characteristics on the aggregate locational outcome.  What I mean by this is that the 
only factors that determine the average choice levels outside of z  are unobserved group effects and 
endogenous social interactions.  Suppose that one observes 
 
 , , , , and  l t l t l t l ty y z z′ ′> < . (24) 
 
Brock and Durlauf call this a pattern reversal: the basic idea is that the observable fundamentals 
suggest one rank ordering of locational outcomes whereas the observed pattern of outcomes 
reverses this ordering.  Under the behavioral model I have described, a pattern reversal can occur 
because  1) the group effects ,l tη  reverse the rank order in outcomes generated by ,l tz  or because 
2) there are multiple equilibria in aggregate outcomes, so that l  has coordinated on a high 
outcome equilibrium whereas l′  has coordinated on a low outcome equilibrium.  When can the 
first explanation be ruled out? Brock and Durlauf provide a set of shape restrictions on ,l tη  such 
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that explanation 2 must be the reason. For example, if higher z  locations draw from a more 
favorable η  distribution, then an observation consistent with eq. (24) allows one to conclude that 
endogenous social interactions are present in the data and that they are strong enough to produce 
multiple equilibria. As such, this is a form of a partial identification argument.   
The appeal of the pattern reversal approach is that it focuses on the one feature of 
endogenous social interactions that other factors simply cannot produce: multiple equilibria.  
Other shape restrictions can also be used. One example is the following. Suppose that the 
unobserved heterogeneity is drawn from a unimodal density.  Suppose that one finds that there 
exists a vector π such that conditional on y , zπ is multimodal.  In other words, multiple equilibria 
are implied if, across locations with common outcomes, the fundamentals associated with them are 
bimodally distributed.  In this case, one can again conclude that social interactions are present and 
strong enough to produce multiple equilibria.  The disparate z ’s that are associated with the same 
aggregate outcomes reflect the different equilibria that can occur for a given group. 
A second strategy is due to Graham’s (2008) extension and generalization of work by 
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) on the impact of endogenous social interactions on 
the variance of average outcomes across locations.  In this work, one considers the relationship 
between the variance of ,l ty  and the population size of l .  If there are no endogenous social 
interactions, then this relationship will be different than when endogenous social interactions are 
present.  Intuitively, endogenous social interactions introduce dependencies across individual 
choices that “slow down” the rate at which the law of large numbers applies.  Glaeser, Sacerdote 
and Scheinkman’s analysis does not allow for group effects; Graham’s achievement is to show that 
if these effects are random rather than fixed, and if the variance is independent of group size, one 
can uncover evidence of endogenous effects by contrasting variances across group sizes.  The 
random effects assumption implicitly requires that location choices are unaffected by their 
presence. 
A third strategy is proposed in Brock and Durlauf (2009) and involves studying transitional 
dynamics.  Their framework considers adoption of a technology, for an educational context one 
can think of the development of skills to use a new technology, for example computers.  Brock 
and Durlauf ask what sorts of restrictions are imposed on adoption over time, when the benefits to 
a technology reflect social interactions.  For their model, they show that social interactions can 
introduce jumps in adoption rates in the economy as well as pattern reversals between adoption 
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rates of those whose private characteristics would suggest they should adopt earlier versus others.  
To be concrete, suppose that one observed that computer technology diffused more slowly in a 
high education location versus another but that there are jumps in the adoption rates of each 
community considered in isolation.  Brock and Durlauf in essence provide sufficient conditions 
under which one can conclude social interactions are present. 
To be clear, none of these strategies is a panacea. Each requires substantive behavior 
assumptions.  Hence their utility can only be assessed in a specific empirical context. 
 
iii. data 
 
My discussion of identification has focused on statistical tools as opposed to data collection.  
One can well imagine that the evidentiary support for social interactions in one sphere can be 
identified from their presence in others.  I conjecture that language use is one direction to pursue.  
It is well understood that dialects are important sources of identity, cf. Wolfram and Schilling-Estes 
(2006).  Nonstandard dialects in Appalachia have been a major topic in the sociolinguistics 
literature; Wolfram and Christian (1976) is an especially detailed study.  I believe that language 
similarity may help provide insights into the appropriate metric for measuring closeness in social 
space and may further represent a marker that helps determine to what extent identity is locally 
driven. Luhman (1990) is an interesting study that considers how standard dialect speakers in 
Kentucky form stereotypes about nonstandard dialect speakers in Kentucky as well as the extent to 
which these stereotypes are accepted.   
 
 
4. Footprints of poverty traps 
 
In this section I focus on some stylized facts about Appalachia that would seem to hint at 
poverty traps.  While this discussion is admittedly speculative, it reflects impressions I have gleaned 
from studies of Appalachia as to ways to uncover social interactions that are strong enough to 
produce poverty traps under the various conceptions that have been described. 
 
i. education 
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The stylized facts on Appalachian educational attainment are suggestive, in my view of a 
poverty trap. Isserman (1996) is one example of a literature that documents how Appalachia 
appears to be an outlier in terms of the high percentage of counties in which less than ½ the 1990 
adult population graduate from high school.  Bollinger, Ziliak and Troske (2009) similarly attribute 
much of Appalachian wages to converge to those in the rest of the country to lower human capital 
formation; this paper is noteworthy for its careful and sophisticated econometrics.  Low human 
capital investment in Appalachia is a good candidate for a mechanism underlying a poverty trap.  
As discussed earlier, the sort of behavioral explanation that one can make is that educational 
investment decisions are interdependent because of both role model and peer influences, so that 
factors such as parental education and the educational choices of peers affect each individual’s 
decisions.  Evidence of social interactions in education has been developed in many studies. Crane 
(1991) is an early example in which interneighborhood variations in high school graduation are 
associated with the occupational characteristics of parents.  Recent examples include Cooley (2008) 
and Hanushek, Kain, Markman and Rivkin, (2003) who focus on peer effects at the school and 
classroom level.  For these reasons, I regard the fact of sustained disparities in education to be a 
hint of a poverty trap.  Nevertheless, by itself, the social interactions/poverty trap interpretation falls 
prey to the sorts of identification problems I have described.   
To proceed, consider two other stylized facts. The first is identified in Isserman: for 
socioeconomic indicators other than education, it is much more difficult to identify Appalachia as 
an outlier relative to the rest of the country.   The finding that high school completion behaves 
differently from other socioeconomic indicators is potentially of great importance in uncovering 
why it occurs.  A second stylized fact is due to Shaw, deYoung, and Rademacher (2004) who find 
that the bulk of the Appalachian educational gap is due to central Appalachia.   This is most starkly 
seen in terms of high school graduation: in 2000 76.8% of Appalachian adults had high school 
degrees as opposed to 80.4% for the US as a whole. In contrast, only 64.1% of central Appalachian 
adults are high school graduates.  The high dispersion of education outcomes in Appalachia across 
subregions provides the sort of variability that helps uncover social interactions. 
In what sense might these additional facts help one make an empirical case for an 
Appalachian poverty trap?  With respect to Isserman, the anomalous behavior of education versus 
other socioeconomic indicators makes an explanation based on unobserved location factors less 
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plausible.  The reason is simple: the unobserved factor will need to be one that only affects 
education, since it evidently does not affect other factors.  While this may apply to teacher quality, 
it does seem plausible from the perspective of social norms.  As for Shaw, deYoung, and 
Rademacher (2004), if it is the case that, assessing county by county, one finds that the low 
educational attainment associated with central Appalachia violates patterns of education as would 
be predicted by variables I have described by ,l tz  above, this would constitute a pattern reversal.  
Interpretation of these reversals as social interactions would require taking a stance on unobserved 
group heterogeneity. If the relevant factor is teacher quality, it is plausible to assume that teacher 
quality is drawn from a distribution that is no better for high outcome counties than others.  
Alternatively, one might wish to assume unimodality of the unobservables and see if one finds 
conditional multimodality in outcomes.  The Graham approach can also be used if one can argue 
that the unobservables are uncorrelated with z .   Lichter and Campbell (2005) document sufficient 
heterogeneity in poverty reductions in the 1990’s to suggest this route may be informative.  
 
ii. migration 
 
Second, I conjecture that substantial information on social interactions can be gleaned from 
understanding the determinants of migration in and out of Appalachia. Whether or not 
Appalachia is a poverty trap, socioeconomic conditions would lead one to expect substantial 
migration away from the region.  Actual migration patterns are in fact much more complicated.  
Obermiller and Howe (2004) document that in the latter 1990’s Appalachia experienced 
substantial inflows and outflows of population. Underlying these flows are important differences 
between in and out migration.  Obermiller and Howe find that central Appalachia experienced 
nontrivial outflows of more skilled adults that were largely counterbalanced by inflows of less 
skilled ones; more generally Baumann and Reagan (2005) argue that slightly over 1/8 of the gap in 
college graduates between Appalachia and the rest of the United States can be attributed to 
migration.   
There appear to be puzzles in the migration patterns that warrant study in terms of what 
they say about social interactions.  One puzzle, at least to me, is that the out migration of the high 
skilled has not been more rapid, especially in light of findings such as Bollinger, Ziliak and Troske 
(2009) that returns to human capital are lower in Appalachia than elsewhere.  Nor is it clear why 
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low skilled workers would choose Appalachia as a destination.  The retention of high skilled 
workers suggests the presence of social interactions effects that make Appalachia more appealing 
than its observed socioeconomic characteristics would suggest.  On the other hand, the in- 
migration of low skilled workers suggests that self-selection issues exist with respect to the 
Appalachian population that mitigate against claims of the region being a poverty trap per se.  My 
point is that analysis of migration decisions can augment social interactions analyses based on 
outcomes other data on Appalachian residents.  Again, as documented by Obermiller and Howe, 
there are interesting migration patterns across Appalachian counties which are related to their 
economic status. Comparisons with migration patterns for other disadvantaged regions may also be 
informative. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In these notes, I have tried to do three things. First, I have described some of the income 
dynamics models that can produce behaviors that capture various facets of the idea of poverty 
traps.  Second, I have discussed some of the statistical challenges facing any effort to establish the 
presence of a poverty trap in a given data set.  Third, I have used Appalachian educational 
attainment as an example of where one might wish to begin a systematic search for evidence in 
light of some established aggregate regularities. 
I end these notes with a few comments on policy.  Poverty trap theories and the associated 
econometrics are largely divorced from the current body of formal empirical work on poverty.  
This means that qualitative work can play a useful and complementary role in providing 
evidentiary support for poverty traps as a general description of Appalachia.  At the same time, the 
gap between theory and empirics means that the current literature provides little quantitative 
guidance on policy construction. This policymaker ignorance should not lead to a Hayekian 
avoidance of policy interventions.  Rather, policymakers should focus on identifying policies that 
are robust in the sense that their efficacy holds across very different environments. 
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